



Self-Declarations of Trust 
 
 




According to Turner LJ in Milroy v Lord, express trusts may be constituted in one of two ways. 
 
[The trust will be] effectual if [the settlor] transfers the property to a trustee for the 
purposes of the settlement, or declares that he himself holds the holds it in trust for 
those purposes.1 
 
The focus of this article is on the latter method of constitution, typically called ‘self-
declarations’ of trust. In such cases the settlor does not convey legal title to trust property to 
a third party, but ‘declares’ that they themselves hold it for the beneficiary.  
 
The leading case is Paul v Constance2, where the deceased partner of the defendant 
had frequently said to the defendant, in respect of a sum of money, ‘This money is as much 
yours as mine’. In finding that this amounted to a self-declaration of trust, Scarman LJ stated 
the principle: ‘… there must be a clear declaration of trust and that means there must be clear 
evidence from what is said or done of an intention to create a trust …’3 In this article we 
attempt to explore the central role played by the ‘declaration’ in such trusts. Despite it being 
crucial to the conceptual coherence of this category of trusts, it is difficult to pin down 
precisely what is meant by the ‘declaration’ requirement.  We seek to explain this, and in 
doing so, to offer some possible explanations as to why the courts recognise and enforce self-








In this section we aim to demonstrate the legal significance of the ‘declaration’. The 
declaration is a distinctive requirement for self-declarations of trust, and does much to mark 
them out as a separate category of transaction. We will show this by comparing self-
declarations of trust to other, similar, transactions, specifically transfers on trust, gifts and 
constructive trusts. From this analysis two points will emerge.  First, in the case of self-
declarations of trust, the making of the ‘declaration’ is the sole constitutive act which creates 
the trust.  Second, the formation and expression of an intention to hold rights in property for 
another will not, in and of itself, count as a ‘declaration’ for these purposes. 
                                                     
1 [1862] 4 De GF & J 264. 
2 [1977] 1 WLR 527. 




1. Self-declarations and transfers on trust 
 
 
A self-declaration of trust is a comparatively recent mode of constituting a trust. Traditionally 
a settlor would create a trust by transferring rights to another, a trustee, to be held for a 
beneficiary. If a settlor skipped the first part, and simply declared that he was holding his 
rights for a volunteer beneficiary, courts would not give effect to the trust.4 This position 
changed as a result of Lord Eldon’s judgment in in Ex parte Pye.5 In Pye, the settlor had 
instructed his agent to purchase an annuity in his mistress’ name. The agent ignored the 
instruction, and purchased the annuity in the settlor’s name. Lord Eldon held that trusts could 
be created in one of two ways: the traditional method of transfer of the legal title, in a manner 
that would be effective at law, to a trustee, and by self-declaration.6 Applying this to the facts, 
it did not matter that the settlor had not transferred the annuity to a trustee, but had merely 
expressed a desire, in his instructions to his agent, to hold them for the beneficiary. In Lord 
Eldon’s words, ‘…he has committed to writing what seems to me a sufficient declaration, that 
he held this part of the estate in trust for the annuitant.’7 The trust was created by a 
declaration rather than a transfer.  
 
The significance of the change wrought by Lord Eldon in Pye becomes clear when one 
compares the two modes of constitution. In the case of a transfer upon trust, the trust  cannot 
be constituted unless and until the settlor succeeds in conveying legal title to the trust 
property to, and vesting it in, the intended trustee by whatever means are necessary at 
common law to achieve this. If the trust property is land, then the settlor must execute a deed 
and register the trustee as proprietor; if it is shares, the settlor must complete the stock 
transfer form and have it approved by the company directors; if it is a chattel, there must be 
a deed or delivery to the trustee. In other words, there must be a recognised form of 
conveyance at law before the trust can arise in equity. Mee suggests that the constitutive act 
of these trusts is the conveyance, rather than the declaration, which, in his view, simply tells 
us something about the settlor’s motive for the the conveyance: did he desire the recipient 
to take absolutely, or to hold for another?8 Consider the recent case of The Charity 
Commission for England and Wales v Framjee9, where donors made donations to particular 
charities through the defendant’s website. The issue was whether the defendant held the 
donations upon trust for the intended charities before the money was paid over to them. It 
is notable that Henderson J (as he then was), in finding that there was a trust, was not 
troubled by the absence of a specific ‘declaration’ by the donors. Instead of a clear oral or 
written statement declaring a trust, we find contextual evidence of the purpose of the 
transfer, from which Henderson J could infer an unexpressed intention to create a trust. On 
                                                     
4 D. Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (OUP 1999) 206;  A. Simpson, A History of the 
Common Law of Contract (Clarendon 1975) 357. However, meritorious consideration in the form of natural 
love and affection would suffice: Colman v Sarell (1789) 1 Ves Jun 50, 54-5, referred to by M. Macnair, ‘Equity 
and Volunteers’ (1988) LS 172, 181. 
5 (1811) 18 Ves Jr 140. The case was preceded by Lord Eldon’s decision in Ellison v Ellison (1802) 6 Ves Jun 656, 
where the consideration requirement had been dropped. 
6 Macnair (n xx) 182. 
7 (1811) 18 Ves Jr 140, 150. 
8 J Mee, ‘Presumed Resulting Trusts, Intention and Declaration’ [2014] CLJ 86, 109. 
9 [2014] EWHC 2507. 
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Mee’s account, this approach makes sense: given the presence of a transaction – the 
conveyance of title to the moneys from donors to the defendant – an unexpressed intention 
to create a trust, inferred from background factors, satisfied the ‘declaration’ requirement. 
Mee’s point is that in the case of trusts by transfer, the ‘declaration’ is relevant only because 
it reveals something about the settlor’s intentions, and not as a specific act that constitutes 
the trust. 
 
When one turns to self-declarations, because legal title remains with the settlor, there 
is no legally relevant act or transaction other than the ‘declaration’ itself.  This alone is 
effective to change the settlor’s status from absolute owner to trustee and give the 
beneficiary equitable title.  It follows that the ‘declaration’ does more than simply provide 
evidence of the settlor’s intentions. As Mee notes: 
 
In the self-declaration situation, the declaration is not merely evidence of the settlor’s 
motive in entering into a particular transaction in a situation where where equity 
regards that motive as controlling the effect of the transaction – instead, the 
declaration of trust is in itself the transaction …10 
 
The difference between transfers on trust and self-declarations lies in the role played by the 
‘declaration’.  In the latter case, because the declaration is the only legally relevant event, 
courts will require evidence of a specific act of ‘declaration’ in order to find a trust. This is 
what created problems in Paul v Constance. Whilst the deceased’s mental state was clear, in 
that he intended to hold the money for himself and his partner, there was no obvious 
‘declaration’ of this intent. Although Scarman LJ eventually concluded that a trust had been 
constituted, he described it as a ‘borderline’ case, where it was ‘not easy to pin-point a 
specific moment of declaration’11 Unlike transfers on trust, in the case of self-declared trusts, 
courts do insist on a ‘declaration’ as it is the very act by which a valid trust is created. What is 
needed, therefore, is some understanding of what kind of statement or act satisfies the 





The role of the ‘declaration’ also comes into focus when self-declarations are compared with 
gifts. It is a settled principle that a donor cannot make a gift of property merely by manifesting 
an intention to do so. In Knight Bruce LJ’s words, ‘… a gratuitously expressed intention, a 
promise merely voluntary, or, to use a familiar phrase, nudum pactum, does not (the matter 
resting there) bind legally or equitably.’12 In addition to manifestation of intention, the donor 
must complete the necessary act of conveyance, such as the execution of a deed or a physical 
delivery of the thing. The classic illustration of this principle is found in Cochrane v Moore.13 
An owner of a horse called Kilworth purported to make a gift of one quarter of the horse to 
the defendant jockey, following the latter’s riding of the horse to victory at a race in Paris. 
There was no doubt over the owner’s intention, as his words to the defendant were perfectly 
                                                     
10 Mee (n xx) 109. 
11 [1977] 1 WLR 527, 532. 
12 Kekewich v Manning (1851) 1 De GM & G 176, 188. 
13 (1890) 25 QBD 57. 
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clear and were followed up with a letter to the stable owner informing him that the defendant 
now held a share in the horse. However, the Court of Appeal held that the gift failed due to 
the absence of a delivery. Lord Esher stated: 
 
… actual delivery in the case of a “gift” is more than evidence of the existence of the 
proposition of law which constitutes a gift, and I have come to the conclusion that it 
is a part of the proposition itself. It is one of the facts which constitute the proposition 
that a gift has been made. It is not a piece of evidence to prove the existence of the 
proposition; it is a necessary part of the proposition, and, as such, is one of the facts 
to be proved by evidence.14  
 
Self-declarations, by contrast, have no such requirements. The settlor need not execute a 
deed15 or physically deliver the trust property to another in order to constitute the 
transaction. He can confer rights by mere words alone.  
 
The line between self-declarations and gifts is a fraught one. When a gift has failed for 
want of delivery, there is an obvious temptation to argue that the donor’s words amounted 
to a self-declaration of trust in the alternative. This is precisely what happened in Cochrane v 
Moore. Fry LJ’s scholarly judgment, which sets out at length the authorities for delivery 
requirement, finishes with the almost casual conclusion that the owner’s words could, 
nonetheless, amount to a declaration of trust: ‘[The owner’s statement] constituted [him] a 
trustee for Moore of one-fourth of the horse Kilworth.’16 It is an odd feature of Cochrane v 
Moore, the case which authoritatively established the delivery requirement, that the donor 
was still able to achieve something very similar to a gift by mere words. 
 
The potential for self-declarations of trust to undermine the substantive requirements 
of gifts is perhaps the ‘unfortunate’17 consequence of Lord Eldon’s decision in Ex parte Pye. 
In the well known case of Richards v Delbridge,18 Lord Jessel MR asserted that it should not 
be possible to save a failed gift by treating it as a self-declaration of trust. The distinction 
between them is a fine one. The question is whether the donor’s words merely convey 
general donative intent, or whether they amount to a declaration of trust. As Alexander 
notes: ‘Stating ‘I give’ without delivering possession has no legal effect; stating ‘I declare a 




This distinction was recently tested in the case of Shah v Shah.20 Dinesh Shah signed a letter, 
which purported to dispose of shares in favour of his brother, Mahendra.  He delivered the 
letter to Mahendra, together with the executed share transfer forms but without a share 
                                                     
14 ibid 75. 
15 Formality requirements may be present due to the subject matter of the trust, such as s. 53(1)(b) of the Law 
of Property Act 1925 if it is a trust of land. 
16 (1890) 25 QBD 57, 73.  
17 Jones v Lock (1865) LR 1 Ch App 25, 28 (Lord Cranworth LC). 
18 (1874) LR 18 Eq 11. 
19 G Alexander, ‘The Transformation of Trusts as a Legal Category 1800-1914’ (1987) 5 Law and History 303, 
331. 
20 [2010] EWCA Civ 1408. 
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certificate (which was held by the company).   The letter stated, ‘I am as from today holding 
4,000 shares in the above company for you subject to you being responsible for all tax 
consequences and liabilities [arising] from this declaration and letter.’  Dinesh argued that the 
letter merely contained an expression of an intention to make a gift, which was never 
completely constituted, and therefore was ineffective to vest title in Mahendra.  The Court of 
Appeal disagreed, and held that in fact the letter contained a valid self-declaration of trust in 
Mahendra’s favour.  Arden LJ21 held that the wording of the letter evinced an intention that 
it would take effect immediately, and as a matter of law this could only involve a disposition 
of the beneficial interest in the shares, as legal title could not pass before the share transfer 
forms had been registered.22 As Dinesh had executed and delivered a stock transfer form, he 
clearly intended registration to occur in due course.  The idea that Dinesh would hold (rather 
than give or assign) the shares for Mahendra pending registration could only be made 
effective by the imposition of a trust and this was what Dinesh had to be taken in law to have 
intended.   Arden LJ remarked that although it could take some time to complete a gift of 
shares by registration, ‘[O]ne of the ways of making an immediate gift is for the donor to 
declare a trust.  In my judgment that is what happened in this case.’23  
 
The outcome in Shah may be contrasted with that in Gorbunova v Berezovsky Estate24 
where the Russian oligarch, Boris Berezovsky, had promised his partner, in a deed, any 
proceeds from a successful outcome in litigation that he was conducting. The material words 
were that ‘[Mr Berezovsky] hereby irrevocably and unconditionally covenants with [Ms 
Gorbunova] that he will pay or procure the payment to [her]’ of the proceeds.  The issue was 
whether this amounted to a trust or a purported gift, with Arnold J stating that for a trust to 
arise: ‘… the words used must show that the settlor intended to dispose of property so that 
someone else acquired the beneficial interest to the exclusion of himself … A mere intention 
to make a gift is insufficient for this purpose.’25 He construed the words in the deed as a 
promise to make a gift of the proceeds to Ms Gorbunova, rather than a declaration of trust, 
as they did not evince an intention to dispose immediately of the beneficial interest in the 
proceeds.26   
 
The principal distinction between gifts and self-declarations of trust is that in the 
former the donor transfers his rights to another, whereas in the latter the settlor holds his 
rights for another. These transactions are completed in different ways. In the case of a gift, 
the donor’s donative intent must be backed up with some act, such as a physical delivery or 
the execution of a deed, that evinces the donor’s intention irrevocably to transfer rights. In 
the case of a self-declaration of trust, because the settlor continues to hold his rights, 
something a little more subtle is required: the settlor must do some act, which the law can 
take cognizance of, which demonstrates that he is now holding his rights in a different 
capacity, i.e. an act that shows that he no longer holds them for himself, but for a beneficiary. 
The most obvious act is the settlor’s ‘declaring’ of this intention. It is this declaration, as 
                                                     
21 Elias and Norris LJJ concurring.  
22 ibid [13]. 
23 ibid [22]. 
24 [2016] EWHC 1829. 
25 ibid [55]. 
26 ibid [60]-[61]. 
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3. Constructive Trusts 
 
The final boundary that puts pressure on the ‘declaration’ requirement is that with 
constructive trusts. The category of constructive trusts is a miscellaneous one, encompassing 
several trusts ‘constructed’ by law for different reasons.27 Some of these, such as trusts arising 
in response to wrongdoing28 or (controversially) unjust enrichment,29 are not important for 
present purposes. The difficult cases are those that are said to arise in response to the 
intention of the parties. The prime example of this, found in the context of family property,30 
is the ‘common intention constructive trust’.31  
 
In the typical ‘sole name’ case a cohabiting couple occupy a house as their family 
home, but the legal title is registered in one of their names only.32 There is usually some form 
of agreement between the parties, which can be express or inferred from their conduct, to 
share the value of the home, and a detrimental reliance by one of the parties on this 
agreement.33 Take the case of Thompson v Hurst34, where the claimant and defendant, who 
had been co-habiting as council tenants, bought their house under a right-to-buy scheme. As 
the claimant’s employment history was quite uneven, they were advised to make the 
mortgage application, and acquire the title to the land, in the defendant’s sole name. They 
continued to live together in the house and, although the defendant was responsible for 
mortgage repayments and other major costs, the claimant did contribute to household 
expenses. When the relationship broke down, the claimant successfully argued that he had 
an interest under a common intention constructive trust. The basis of this trust was the trial 
judge’s finding that, while the parties had not intended to become legal co-owners, they had 
intended to share in the value of the home. This common intention was inferred from the 
initial discussion between the parties as well as their subsequent conduct. The claimant had 
also relied upon this agreement to his detriment. 
 
The precise requirements of the common intention constructive trust are a matter of 
some dispute.35 The courts have traditionally applied a restrictive approach to the question 
                                                     
27 See YK Liew, ‘Reanalysing Institional and Remedial Constructive Trusts’ [2016] CLJ 306, for a helpful overview 
of the category.  
28 FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45. 
29 Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd [1981] Ch 105, cf Westdeutsche Landesbank 
Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] UKHL 12. 
30 Other examples might include the Pallant v Morgan equity. 
31 See Marr v Collie [2017] UKPC 17 for the most recent judicial analysis of the ‘common intention constructive 
trust’. 
32 This is in contrast to joint names cases, such as Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432, where the parties are 
jointly registered as proprietors and a statutory trust arises under s. 34 of the Law of Property Act 1925.  
33 See Abbott v Abbott [2007] UKPC 53 for an example of a ‘single name’ family home case. 
34 [2012] EWCA Civ 1752. 
35 The case law and academic literature on this topic is huge. For an excellent account of the current state of 
the law, see B Sloan, ‘Keeping up with the Jones case: establishing constructive trusts in the ‘sole legal owner’ 
scenarios’ (2015) 35 LS 226. 
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of what types of evidence might be admitted of a common intention36, but more recent cases 
have been much more liberal in this regard.37 What is entailed in the ‘detrimental reliance’ 
requirement is also a difficult question. What is not disputed, however, is that a common 
intention is necessary for the creation of such trusts. Etherton LJ made this clear in Thompson 
v Hurst when he said:  
 
In the case of a single legal owner, such as the present, where there is no express 
declaration of a trust, the claimant has first to establish some sort of implied trust, 
normally what is now termed a common intention constructive trust … The claimant 
must show that it was intended that he or she was to have a beneficial interest at all. 
That can only be achieved by evidence of the parties' actual intentions, express or 
inferred, objectively ascertained.38 
 
This was also made clear in the leading case of Jones v Kernott39, where Lord Walker and Lady 
Hale said: ‘The first issue is whether it was intended that the other party have a beneficial 
interest in the property at all.’40  
 
In a case such as Thompson v Hurst, if the court finds that the parties have a ‘common 
intention’, then it must also be true to say that the legal proprietor has formed an intention 
to hold her title, in part, for the other party. Given this fact, one might ask why this is not 
simply categorized as an express trust, rather than a constructive trust? One answer might be 
found in s. 53(1)(b) of the Law of Porperty Act 1925, which provides that an express trust of 
land must be manifested and proved in writing. The intention of the legal proprietor in 
Thompson v Hurst was established by parol evidence, not written. For some commentators 
this means that these trusts can only take effect as constructive trusts, as these have no 
formal requirements.41 We would suggest that this is a slightly superficial answer to the 
question. If Parliament, for instance, were to abolish s. 53, would we be happy to reclassify 
the trust in Thompson v Hurst, and other family homes cases, as ‘express trusts’, constituted 
by self-declarations? Perhaps not. What typically happens in these cases is that the intention 
of the parties, so far as it exists, emerges over time, and is inferred from vague discussions 
and a pattern of behaviour. There is rarely anything that might be called a ‘declaration’; 
rather, it is the cumulative conduct and discussions of the parties which gradually leads to an 
understanding between them.42 Given that intent is inferred in this way, perhaps the category 
of ‘implied trusts’43 would be the natural home for these cases. However, ever since Maitland 
                                                     
36 Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107. 
37 Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432, per Baroness Hale at para [69]. 
38 [2012] EWCA Civ 1752, [22]. 
39 [2011] UKSC 53. 
40 ibid [52] (emphasis added) 
41 For critical discussion of this view, see W Swadling, ‘The Nature of the Trust in Rochefoucald v Boustead’ in C 
Mitchell (ed), Constructive and Resulting Trusts (Hart, Oxford 2010). 
42 A good comparison might be personal property cases involving similarly vague commitments to share the 
value of the thing, where courts have adopted a constructive trust analysis. See De Bruyne v De Bruyne [2010] 
EWCA Civ 519 for an example, but cf Rowe v Prance (n xx). 
43 Reference to trusts created by ‘implication of law’ are found in the Statute of Frauds 1677, s. viii. The 
modern equivalent, s. 53(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925, continues to refer to ‘implied trust’. Early editions 
of some trusts treatises contained sections on ‘implied trusts’ (e.g. see J Flint (ed), Lewin on Trusts (8th ed, 
Charles Edson, Boston 1888) at 108). 
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argued that there is no such thing as an ‘implied trust’44, it does not appear that any court or 
scholar has taken them seriously as a category of trust.45 Maitland’s argument was that 
whenever intention was ‘implied’ or ‘inferred’ from words and conduct, there was simply an 
express trust. This is problematic as it fails to recognize that it is not intention per se that 
creates the trust, but the declaration of the intent. In cases where intention has to be ‘implied’ 
or ‘inferred’, it will always be difficult to say that the settlor has ‘declared’ her intent.  
 
What this analysis shows is that not all trusts based upon intention are ‘express trusts’. 
Some intention-based trusts are classed, in the absence of an ‘implied trust’ category, as 
‘constructive’. Further, the line between express and constructive trusts seems to relate to 
the role played by intention. In the common intention constructive trust, intention is 
necessary, but not usually sufficient, for the creation of the trust. Courts tend to consider 
other factors, such as detrimental reliance of the co-habiting partner, as important for the 
creation of the trust. By contrast, in self-declarations, the settlor’s intention, or rather, the 
form in which the intention is manifested, the declaration, is sufficient for the creation of the 
trust. As Bryan recently put it: 
 
The difference lies in the distinction between an objective manifestation of intention 
as a constitutive act for the creation of express trust obligations, and an intention 
which is not a constitutive act but which, in conjunction with other factors, justifies 
the imposition of a constructive trust.46  
 
Pulling these threads together, we can see the importance attached to the declaration of 
trust. It is not merely a necessary fact for the establishment of the trust; it is the legally 








In the last section we saw that simply because a person has formed the intention to hold their 
rights for the benefit of another, does not mean that there has been a ‘self-declaration’ of 
trust. If it did then the line between express trusts, and intention-based constructive trusts, 
would break down. As French CJ recently warned, ‘The ascertainment of an express trust may 
come to resemble the imposition of a constructive trust …’47 To avoid this the law needs to 
conceptualise the thing that distinguishes self-declarations from other types of trust, namely 
the ‘declaration’.    
 
The origins of the word, ‘declaration’ are to be found in the Latin, declarare, which 
means to make clear.  A ‘declaration’ is therefore defined as: ‘the action of explaining or 
                                                     
44 Maitland, Equity and the Forms of Action, 75-76. 
45 See G Costigan, The Classification of Trusts as Express, Resulting and Constructive (1914) 27 HLR 437, 438-
439 for discussion of Maitland’s arguments. 
46 M Bryan, ‘The Inferred Trust: An Unhappy Marriage of Contract and Trust’ (2016) 69 CLP 377. 
47 Korda v Australian Executor Trustees (SA) Ltd [2015] HCA 6, [8]. 
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making clear’; ‘the action of setting forth, stating, or announcing, publicly, formally, or 
explicitly; a positive statement, an emphatic or solemn assertion’; or, in law, ‘a formal 
affirmation or statement, usually made in writing’.48 In linguistic terms, a declaration is a 
particular kind of illocutionary (or speech) act,49 which is performative, in that its 
propositional content (i.e., its object) may be achieved merely by its utterance, i.e., where 
‘saying makes it so’.50   As Searle explains, ‘If I successfully perform the act of declaring a state 
of war, then war is on.’51 In the following sections we will consider the different ways in which 
we might think of this ‘illocutionary act’ as a legal concept.  
 
1. The ‘declaration’ as a pure formality 
 
One way to conceptualise the ‘declaration’ is purely as a legal formality. In this model one 
draws a distinction between the substantive fact which is stated, and the form in which it is 
expressed, the declaration. A formality, as Birks explains, may be thought of as an ‘additional 
requirement’: 
 
[A] formal requirement will be one which either adds to what would ‘naturally’ be 
done or restricts the modes in which it could so be done by excluding some which 
would seem to work just as well if the law would let them.52  
 
Whilst there is no single type of formality53, the rules that we tend to refer to as ‘formalities’ 
have similar functions, such as the promotion of caution, the provision of evidence of the 
intention of the parties, and the prevention of fraud.54  Can we think of a declaration as 
something that performs these functions, by imposing an additional requirement on what 
would otherwise ‘naturally’ be done to create a trust? 
 
Judges sometimes appear to think of ‘declarations’ in other areas of law as a type of 
formality. Take the case of Neptune (Vehicle Washing Equipment) Ltd v Fitzgerald55 where the 
court considered the requirement under s.317 of the Companies Act 1985 that a director who 
had an interest in a contract with the company must ‘declare’ the nature of that interest at a 
meeting of the company. Here, the relevant substantive fact was the director’s interest.  
Lightman J explained that the effect of s.317 was to ensure that that this would be drawn to 
                                                     
48 R. Trumble & A. Stevenson (eds), Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th ed) (Oxford University Press 2002), 
vol I, 606. 
49 On illocutionary acts generally, see R. Searle and D. Vanderveken, Foundations of Illocutionary Logic 
(Cambridge University Press 1985) 1; D. Vanderveken, Meaning and Speech Acts, Volume 1 Principles of 
Language Use (Cambridge University Press 1990-1991) 8. 
50 R. Searle, ‘A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts’ in R. Searle, Expression and Meaning, Studies in the Theory of 
Speech Acts (Cambridge University Press 1979) 16.  
51 ibid 17. 
52 P Birks, The Roman Law of Obligations (OUP, Oxford 2014) 34.  
53 Consider, for instance, the different formal rules for the creation and disposition of equitable interests found 
in s. 53(1)(b) and s. 53(1)(c) of the Law of Property Act 1925: the former is an ‘evidential rule’ which requires 
written evidence of the transaction, whereas the latter is ‘constitutive rule’ where the formality is the 
transaction.  
54 P. Mechem, ‘The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in Action Evidenced by 
Commercial Instruments’ (1926-1927) 21 Ill L Rev 341, 348-349; L. Fuller, ‘Consideration and Form’ (1941) 41 
Colum L Rev 799, 800-801. 
55 [1996] Ch 274. 
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the attention of all the directors, but this must happen in a particular way.  He held that the 
making of the declaration ‘should be the occasion for a statutory pause for thought about the 
existence of the conflict of interest and of the duty to prefer the interests of the company to 
their own’.56  The disclosure of the interest had to be ‘a distinct happening at the meeting’ 
and recorded in the minutes.57  Where more than one director was present at the meeting, 
the declaration had to be made out loud, and a failure to record it in the minutes would not 
preclude proof that it had been made.  Where the company was run by a sole director, he 
could make the declaration alone, and even silently, but it had to be recorded in the minutes, 
as otherwise ‘the court may well find it difficult to accept that the declaration was made’.58  
Lightman J’s remarks suggest that he clearly regarded the declaration as performing some or 
all of the functions of a legal formality.  He explicitly referred to its cautionary effect and, 
where it was made in the presence of other directors, its evidentiary function.   It was also 
likely to perform a channeling function, by providing a process which – in the absence of any 
objections at the meeting - would enable the director to proceed with the transaction despite 
the apparent conflict of interest.   
 
In trusts cases, the substantive fact is the settlor’s intention, as no trust can arise 
without proof of it.59 If a court is satisfied that a settlor formed the intention to hold rights 
for the benefit of another, that finding of fact may ‘naturally’ justify the creation of a trust.  If 
the ‘declaration’ is significant purely as a legal formality, we would be saying that it imposes 
an ‘additional requirement’ to the proof of the settlor’s intention, specifically, the need to 
express the intention in a particular way. Conversely, we would also be saying that the 
‘declaration’ could lead to the creation of a trust even if the substantive underlying fact, the 
intention, was absent.  
 
In some self-declared trust cases the courts appear to regard the ‘declaration’ as 
having formal significance.  We can perhaps see this in Paul v Constance where, it will be 
recalled, a settlor had told his partner on several occasions that a particular sum of money 
was ‘as much yours as mine’. The court, in construing these terms, had little doubt that the 
necessary fact of intention was present. What troubled the court was whether this intention 
was expressed in the appropriate form, with Scarman LJ noting the trouble in pinpointing ‘… 
a specific moment of declaration …’60 If the declaration is a form, separate from the 
underlying fact of the settlor’s intention, then what does the form consist of? Is there a 
particular set of words that, when uttered, produce the effect of the trust regardless of 
whether or not the underlying fact of intention is present? An analogy might be found in the 
Roman contract of stipulatio, which required parties to contract by a question and answer 
that used corresponding verbs (‘Will you give?’, ‘I will give’; ‘Do you promise?’, ‘I do promise’ 
etc). Failure to express the agreement in this way would render the contract void, 
notwithstanding the fact that the parties were in agreement with each other. Is there 
anything comparable in trusts? If there were ‘magic words’, the obvious ones would be ‘I 
declare myself trustee,’ which would, by their utterance, have a performative effect.   
 
                                                     
56 Ibid 283. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid 284. 
59 Knight v Knight (1840) 3 Beav 148; 49 ER 58. 
60 [1977] 1 WLR 527, 532. 
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 However, it  is clear that the failure to use words such as ‘declare’ and ‘trust’ does not 
prevent a self-declared trust from arising, and that in fact, for these purposes, ‘a declaration’ 
is a fairly loose concept.  The ‘declaration’ does not require the settlor’s intention to be 
expressed in any particular way, and it may be written61 or oral.62   There is also authority that 
a ‘declaration’ may also be inferred from conduct,63 or, at the very least, from what the settlor 
has said or done.64 Where words are used, they must be ‘clear, unequivocal and irrevocable, 
but it is not necessary to use any technical words’.65   Thus, ‘any expressions will suffice, from 
which it is clear that the party using them considers himself a trustee, and adopts that 
character.’66  Although, occasionally, the solemnity of the circumstances in which the 
‘declaration’ is made has been emphasized by the courts,67 generally this does not seem to 
be a relevant feature when assessing whether a ‘declaration’ has been made.  Furthermore, 
there appears to be little, if any, discussion about the cautionary or evidentiary effect of the 
‘declaration’, which one might expect to see if the courts were concerned with its status as a 
formality.    
 
Take, for example, Rowe v Prance68, where the defendant, who was in a relationship 
with the claimant, acquired title to a yacht and invited the claimant to live on it with him. The 
defendant had casually referred to the yacht as ‘ours’ on a few occasions. When coupled with 
other background factors, such as the claimant’s giving up of her lease and their treating the 
yacht as their residence, this led the court to conclude that a trust had been created. Warren 
QC, sitting as a high court judge, said:  
 
I am satisfied that Mr Prance effectively constituted himself an express trustee of the 
boat; writing is not required since we are dealing with personal property in relation to 
which there is no formality.69 
 
The facts of Rowe v Prance could not be further removed from the paradigm ‘declaration’ 
where a settlor solemnly executes a deed which states ‘I declare a trust’. The notable feature 
of the case is the casualness of the communications.  
 
Indeed, it seems that the existence of a ‘declaration’ does not depend on the 
utterance by the settlor of any particular words at all.  For example, in Re Kayford,70 a mail 
order company took advice from its accountants as to how ensure that any customers who 
had paid it money but not yet received goods, could be refunded if the company became 
insolvent.  The accountants advised the company to transfer the customers’ moneys from its 
current account to a separate savings account, to be designated ‘Customers’ Trust Deposit 
Account’.  The moneys were transferred into a dormant company account but the bank did 
not give the account the required designation until the day after the company went into 
                                                     
61 e.g., Middleton v Pollock (1876) 2 Ch D 104. 
62 e.g., M’Fadden v Jenkyns  (1842) 1 Ph 153, 157 (Lord Lyndhurst LC); 41 ER 859; Paul v Constance (n xx). 
63 Heartley v Nicholson (1874-1875) LR 19 Eq 233, 242 (Bacon VC).  
64 Paul v Constance (n xx) 531 (Scarman LJ). 
65 Grant v Grant (1865) 34 Beav 623, 625 (Romilly MR). 
66 Dipple v Corles (1853) 11 Hare 183, 184; 68 ER 1239. 
67 e.g., Choithram International SA v Pagarani [2001] 1 WLR 1, 12 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
68 [1999] 2 FLR 787. 
69 ibid. 
70 [1975] 1 WLR 279. 
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voluntary liquidation.  Nevertheless, Megarry VC had no doubt that a trust had been 
established.  He held that there was no need to use the words ‘trust’ or ‘confidence’, and the 
question was ‘whether in substance a sufficient intention to create a trust has been 
manifested.’71   The purpose of transferring the moneys into the savings account was ‘to 
ensure that the moneys remained in the beneficial ownership of those who sent them’, and 
a trust was ‘the obvious means of achieving this’.72  A trust could be created by the company 
if it took ‘suitable steps on or before receiving the money’ and this would be sufficient to 
transform the company’s obligations towards the customer ‘from contract to property, from 
debt to trust’.73  The segregation of money in a separate account was unnecessary, but it was 
a ‘useful’ indication of the company’s intention to create a trust.  Megarry VC clearly regarded 
the segregation of the moneys as sufficient to support the finding that a trust had been 
declared, as the trust was held to cover all moneys paid in by customers, including those 
which had been paid in before the account had been expressly designated as a trust account..   
 
Together, these cases74 suggest that the ‘declaration’ requirement may be satisfied 
not by the presence of particular words, but because the court is satisfied, as a result of the 
settlor’s words and conduct around the time the trust is alleged to have been created,75 that 
he or she has formed an intention to hold the rights for the benefit of another.  Conversely, 
using the magic words of ‘declaration’ and ‘trust’ do not lead to the creation of the trust, if 
the underlying fact of intention (objectively interpreted76) is not present.  Take the recent 
case of Singha v Heer77, which involved a dispute between business partners. The claimant 
had provided a loan to the defendant to fund the purchase of a home, the defendant granting 
a mortgage in return. In written correspondence between the parties, the defendant had 
referred to his holding the title to the land ‘on trust’ for the claimant. The court held that this 
did not automatically constitute a trust, but that the court must ask what intention is 
reasonably conveyed by these words. In the context they meant no more than an admission 
of the claimant’s security interest. A similar point emerges from Re B (child; property 
transfer),78 where a stipulation that a mother was to hold 70% of the proceeds of sale of the 
family home ‘for the benefit of’ her daughter was held to be no more than an incantation of 
certain relevant statutory wording, and did not create a trust for the daughter. 
 
In light of the above, it seems clear that the ‘declaration’ does not operate purely as a 
formal requirement, as it neither adds anything to, nor is a substitute for, the settlor’s 
intention.  It is difficult, therefore, to prize apart the ‘declaration’ requirement from the need 
to establish the settlor’s intention to hold rights for another.  If this is right, then the crucial 
question is what type of intention is required. This brings us back to the difficulty, averted to 
earlier, of distinguishing such trusts from intention-based constructive trusts where, it will be 
                                                     
71 ibid 282. 
72 ibid. 
73 ibid. 
74 See also Re English and American Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 1 BCLC 649; Re Branston & Gothard Ltd [1999] 1 
All ER (Comm) 289; Re Lewis’s of Leicester Ltd [1995] 1 All ER 192, [1994] 1 WLR 1181 – all cases where the fact 
of, and reasons, for segregation, were crucial to the recognition of the trust.    
75 Bentley v Mackay (1851) 15 Beav 12, 19; 51 ER 440, 441 (Romilly MR). 
76 Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Queensland) v Jolliffe (1920) 28 CLR 178, 187 (Isaacs J, dissenting); applied, 
Byrnes v Kendle (n xx) [28] (Doyle J). 
77 [2016] EWCA Civ 424. 
78 [1999] 3 FCR 266; [1999] 2 FLR 418 (CA). 
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recalled, there is also a requirement that settlors form an intention to hold rights for another. 
Why, it may be asked, is the ‘declaration’ requirement not equally satisfied in those cases?79 
 
 
2. Declarations as ‘intention to be bound’ 
 
If the declaration requirement is not a matter of form, then this would suggest that is it a 
matter of substantive fact. If so, then what fact must be proved under the ‘declaration’ 
requirement? We would suggest that it is concerned with the settlor’s intention. Not, it 
should be stressed, the settlor’s basic intent to hold rights for the benefit of another. Rather, 
it is the settlor’s intention that, by their words or actions, they thereby hold rights for the 
benefit of another. To put it a little differently, we are suggesting that for an express trust to 
be effectively declared, two separate intentions must be manifested: (a) An intention to hold 
rights for the benefit of another, and (b) An intention that by the settlor’s very words or 
action, the trust relationship should be immediately constituted.  
 
(a) An intention to hold rights for the benefit of another 
 
The settlor’s intention to hold rights for the benefit of another is itself a composite intention.  
The effect of the trust is not only to confer the right to beneficial enjoyment of the property 
on the beneficiary but also to subject the settlor to the obligations of a trustee.  Therefore, 
the settlor’s intention must be to retain his or her legal rights to the property, whilst 
conferring the benefit of the property on another and coming under ‘an onerous obligation’ 
to that person.80   The courts tend to emphasise the first element, i.e., the intention to confer 
a benefit on another.  The key question is said to be whether the settlor has divested himself 
or herself of the entire interest in the property,81 such that whatever legal right he or she 
retains is held in trust for the beneficiary.82  Fewer authorities dwell on the obligations of 
trusteeship.  However, on occasion the courts have asked whether the settlor ‘intended to 
subject himself to all the consequences of the liability to account …’83  
 
One reason why the courts focus more on whether the settlor had an intention to part 
with the beneficial interest in the property is perhaps because many self-declared trusts will 
be bare trusts.  This is the likely consequence, at least in cases where the ‘declaration’ was 
oral or has been inferred from the settlor’s conduct.  If the trust is a bare trust, the settlor-
trustee will not be subject to management or administrative duties.84   However, there are 
cases relating to transfers on trust, which suggest that bare trustees are not necessarily free 
of the core fiduciary obligation of loyalty, at least where they have accepted the terms of the 
                                                     
79 e.g., Royal Bank of Scotland v Brogan [2012] NICh 21. 
80 A. Chaytor & W. Whittaker (eds), J. Brunyate, F. Maitland, Equity, a Course of Lectures (Cambridge University 
Press 1936) 72. 
81 Bentley v Mackay (1851) 15 Beav 12; 51 ER 440,  
82 Warriner v Rogers Law Rep 16 Eq 340, 348 (Bacon VC); cited with approval in Richards v Delbridge (1874) LR 
18 Eq 11.  For similar statements, see Grant v Grant (1865) 34 Beav 623, 625 (Lord Romilly MR); Jones v Lock 
(1865) 1 Ch App 25, 29 (Lord Cranworth LC); Paul v Constance (n xx) 531. 
83 Dipples v Corles (n xx) 186 (Page Wood VC); see also Lyell v Kennedy, Kennedy v Lyell (1889) 14 App Cas 437, 
457 (HL) (Lord Selborne) 
84 Christie v Ovington (1875) 6 Ch D 279, 281 (Hall VC); Re Docwra (1885) 29 Ch D 693, 696 (Bacon VC). 
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trust;85 a fortiori in the case of self-declared trustees.  Moreover, a self-declared trustee is 
also likely to be subject to minimal custodial obligations, such as not to dispose of the 
property for his or her own benefit.  
 
 
(b) An intention that by the settlor’s very words or action, the trust relationship be constituted 
 
 
It is quite common for a settlor to intend not only the creation of a trust, but its creation by a 
specific utterance or action. Take the case of Rabin v Gerson86 where the claimant expressed, 
in instructions to counsel, a wish to advance money to a Jewish educational association upon 
a charitable trust. However, the trust deed subsequently executed by the claimant did not 
reflect this, with the words in the deed conveying an intent to make an absolute gift to the 
association. The court held that it was not permissible to consider the communications with 
counsel as evidence of the terms of the transfer. Fox LJ said: ‘Such evidence, I think, is simply 
parol evidence of the intention of the grantor … The result, in my view, is that the opinions 
cannot be referred to generally for the assistance that their contents may give.’87 One may 
argue that this ignores the intention of the settlor, as it was clear from the earlier 
communication that a charitable trust, not an outright gift, was desired. However, to take this 
view would be to ignore the role of the document. Where a settlor has created a trust by 
executing a trust deed, the normal inference is that they intended the transaction to take 
effect according to terms contained in the document. Earlier drafts and other statements of 
intent may be vague or inconsistent, reflecting changes or refinements of their wishes. The 
final document is usually meant to supersede these earlier expressions by giving a final 
statement of the terms.88 The important point for present purposes is that the settlor did not 
merely intend a transaction; they also intended that the transaction take effect according to 
a specific utterance, the execution of the deed.  The court would have frustrated this intention 
had they admitted evidence of earlier statements in ascertaining the terms of the trust.  
 
 Although concerned with an issue of interpretation, rather than constitution, what 
Rabin v Gerson illustrates is the double nature of a settlor’s intention, which must be present 
in order that a self-declared trust may be constituted. There may be an underlying desire to 
hold rights for another’s benefit, but the settlor must also intend, by a specific statement or 
act, for those legal consequences to follow. For this to happen, it is unnecessary that the 
settlor understand precisely the mechanics of trust law; it is sufficient if he or she broadly 
understands the consequences of his or her actions, i.e., that he or she is holding rights for 
another person’s benefit.89 
 
                                                     
85 Brown v IRC [1965] AC 244 (HL), 265 (Lord Upjohn); Clarence House Ltd v National Westminster House Ltd v 
National Westminster Bank plc [2010] 1 WLR 1216 [43] (Ward LJ) 
86 [1986] 1 WLR 526. 
87 ibid 531-532. 
88 As some scholars have pointed out, the parol evidence rule functions in a way that is similar to ‘entire 
agreement’ clauses. For discussion see D McLauchlan, ‘The Entire Agreement Clause: Conclusive or a Question 
of Weight?’ (2012) 128 LQR 521. 
89 Byrnes v Kendle [2009] SASC 385.  
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It follows that expressing a desire to create a trust in the future will not constitute a 
‘declaration’.90  This is clear from Bayley v Boulcott,91 where a mother was entitled to property 
under the will of a relation.  In a conversation with the executor of the will, she expressed an 
intention to make a settlement of part of that property upon her daughter, and requested 
him to instruct her solicitor to prepare the settlement. When it was brought to her for 
execution, she had changed her mind and refused to sign it. Leach MR held that a declaration 
of trust of personal property could be made orally, but the mother’s conversation with the 
solicitor could not be considered ‘as being, on her part, a fixed and concluded declaration of 
trust in favour of the daughter.’92  It was no more than an expression of her intention to make 
a declaration of trust in the future by an instrument which she had authorised the executor 
to prepare, the terms of which had not yet even been considered. 
 
The same approach can be seen in the case of Re Farepak Food and Gifts Ltd.93 A 
company officer, aware that the company was about to go bankrupt, telephoned the 
company’s solicitors and instructed them to draw up a deed declaring a trust over the 
company’s current account (which contained customer moneys) for the benefit of the 
customers. When the deed was drafted, owing to some confusion on the solicitor’s part, the 
deed referred to an (empty) savings account. In an attempt to avoid having to plead 
rectification of the trust deed, it was argued that, prior to the execution of the flawed 
document, a trust over the current account had already been constituted: the settlor had, it 
was pointed out, already expressed a clear intention to create a trust over the current account 
in the conversation with the solicitor when the instructions were initially given. Rejecting the 
argument, Mann J said: 
 
The directors clearly manifested an intention to create a trust, but they have to do 
something in the nature of a declaration in order actually to create it. What they did 
was execute the deed of trust. There is no evidence of any other act going beyond a 
mere declaration of intention, apart from the execution of the deed, that is even a 
candidate. Accordingly an express trust arises out of the deed or not at all.94 
 
It is worth pausing to consider this. The company officer had, in the telephone conversation 
prior to the execution of the deed, expressed in the clearest terms a desire to hold moneys 
on trust for the benefit of its customers. Why could that not amount to a declaration of trust? 
The answer, it is suggested, is because, as in Bayley v Boulcott, the officer did not intend those 
particular words – uttered in the course of the telephone conversation – to constitute the 
trust. This is obvious from the fact that they were desirous of executing a more formal 
document shortly after. There may have been an intention to create a trust, but not by those 
particular words.  Both cases may be contrasted with Shah v Shah,95 where the words ‘I am 
as from today holding … for you’ in a letter were held to evince a clear intention that the letter 
would immediately confer a beneficial interest in the shares, and thereby create a trust.   
 
                                                     
90 Grant v Grant (1865) 34 Beav 623, 625 (Lord Romilly MR). 
91 (1828) 4 Russ 345; 38 ER 835. See also De Bruyne v De Bruyne [2010] EWCA Civ 519. 
92 ibid 347 (Leach MR). 
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In light of the cases discussed above, it seems fair to say that the expression – through 
words or acts – of an intention to be immediately bound is a necessary prerequisite to a 
finding that a trust has been successfully declared.96  Two further observations may be made 
in this regard.  First, even though the courts do not require proof of a performative 
illocutionary act such as ‘I declare a trust’, the underlying intention which they look for is the 
same as that which underpins such an explicit declaration.  Second, the type of intention 
required to create an enforceable self-declared trust is very similar, if not identical to that 
required for the valid non-physical delivery of deeds97 and, arguably, the making of 
promises,98  i.e., an intention that the words or acts of the maker of the deed or the promisor 
immediately bind him or her and thus have peremptory effect.   
 
 
3. Declarations as open or public acts, or acts of communication  
 
If the argument in the previous section is accepted, the question then arises whether the only 
significance of the ‘declaration’ lies in the fact that it constitutes an expression of the settlor’s 
intention.  Is there anything to suggest that to constitute a ‘declaration’ for these purposes, 
the settlor’s words or acts must also be communicated to someone else, or made public in 
some way?   In other words, will an entirely private ‘declaration’ suffice to create a trust?   
 
There does not appear to be any legal requirement that for a ‘declaration’ to create a 
valid trust it must be made publicly.  Thus, a settlor can make a valid ‘declaration’, even if he 
or she has not communicated their intention to the intended beneficiary.  For example, in 
Benbow v Townsend,99 the testator lent £2,000 by way of mortgage to the trustees of 
Tottenham Court Chapel, and subsequently said to them that he should receive the interest 
on the loan, but that the principal was to be his brother, Job’s.  After the testator died, his will 
made no mention of the mortgage, and the question was whether the £2,000 belonged to his 
estate or to Job.  The executor and residuary legatees argued that because the testator had 
not communicated his intention to Job, no trust was created and the testator’s act had been 
revocable, so the money resulted back to his estate.   The court rejected this argument and 
held that the property belonged to Job, ‘by force of the testator’s declaration that the £2,000 
should, after his own death, be the property of his brother, Job.’100    
 
Furthermore, a written ‘declaration’ will be valid, even if it is not contemporaneously 
communicated or shown to anyone else at all.  Middleton v Pollock101 provides a vivid 
example.  A solicitor, who had died insolvent, was found to have declared himself trustee of 
certain property for E. The ‘declaration’ took the form of a memorandum, by which the 
solicitor declared himself trustee of the property to secure the repayment of money he had 
                                                     
96 Stablewood Properties Ltd v Virdi [2010] EWCA Civ 865, esp [28]-[29] (Arden LJ). 
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of HLA Hart (Oxford University Press 1977) 211, 217, 224.  See also J.R.  Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the 
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99 Benbow v Townsend (1833) 1 My & K 506, 39 ER 772; see also Ex parte Pye (n xx); Wheatley v Purr (1837) 1 
Keen 551; 48 ER 419; Stapleton v Stapleton (1844) 14 Sim 186; 60 ER 328; Standing v Bowring (1885) 31 Ch D 
282. 
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received from E but failed to repay.  The memorandum was found in his safe after he died, 
together with other similar memoranda in favour of other clients.  Its contents had never 
been disclosed to E, and there is nothing in the case which suggests it had been disclosed to 
anyone else at the time it was made.  The court held that even if the solicitor had executed 
the memorandum with knowledge of his insolvency, E was still entitled to the benefit of the 
security against the other creditors because the solicitor was not a bankrupt when he made 
the declaration of trust, and intended to give them security.  This conclusion presupposes that 
the declaration of trust was valid even though it had not been communicated to E (or anyone 
else).  There is also academic support for the view that a written ‘declaration’ may create a 
valid trust and thereby sever a joint tenancy by partial alienation, even where it is made 
entirely privately.102 
 
Turning to oral declarations of trust, a declaration made in the presence of witnesses 
will suffice to create a trust,103 but it is unclear whether an oral declaration made privately 
will have the same effect.  There are two reasons why this may seem difficult to envisage.  
First, a solitary expression of intention, a commitment made in private to oneself, is 
something that may give rise to evidential difficulties unless it is recorded or its maker attests 
to having made it.  Second, the question arises whether such a ‘declaration’ would ever 
adequately demonstrate the settlor’s intent for the trust to be immediately and irrevocably 
constituted by his or her very words or actions. 
 
Lightman J’s comments in the Neptune case104 suggest that in a company law context 
the courts may be prepared to take cognisance of ‘declarations’ made privately.  A sole 
director held a board meeting with the company secretary, at which he authorised a payment 
by the company to himself.  The minutes of the meeting made no reference to his having 
declared his interest in the arrangement, as required by s.317 of the Companies Act 1985. On 
a summary judgment application by the company, Lightman J held that there was a triable 
issue as to whether in fact the relevant declaration had been made at the meeting, and so he 
granted the director leave to defend the action.  He also went further and remarked (obiter) 
that it was possible for a director to make the relevant declaration aloud to himself or 
mentally at a solo meeting where no-one else was present, although if it were not recorded 
in the minutes, the court would find it difficult to take cognisance of it.  This may be because, 
like an unexpressed mental resolution to hold property on trust, such a ‘declaration’ is 
objectively unknowable.105  By analogy with Neptune, it may be argued that a private mental 
resolution to hold property on trust for another may be treated as a valid ‘declaration’ if it is 
recorded by the settlor and therefore capable of objective proof.    
 
The more difficult question is whether an oral ‘declaration’ of trust, which was made 
privately but overheard by a third party, is sufficient to create a trust.  The authors are 
unaware of any authority directly on point.  On the Neptune analysis, a ‘declaration’ made in 
such a way would be capable of objective proof and therefore valid.  However, there are 
differences between declarations of interest and declarations of trust, which arguably cast 
doubt on such a conclusion.  The purpose of making a declaration of interest is exculpatory - 
                                                     
102 J. Brown, ‘Severance of Joint Tenancy of Land by Partial Alienation’ (2001) 117 LQR 477, 491.  
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104 [1996] Ch 274. 
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to obtain the company’s consent to what would otherwise constitute a breach of fiduciary 
duty - and it does not give rise to any obligation on the director’s part.  The effect of a valid 
‘declaration’ of trust is immediately and irrevocably to subject the alleged settlor to an 
obligation to hold the property for the benefit of another, and to transfer the beneficial 
interest in the property to that person.  For this reason, it must be debatable whether equity 
should treat words privately spoken by a settlor to himself aloud as sufficient without more 
to evince an intention thereby irrevocably to bind himself as trustee.  Intuitively, it seems 
preferable to conclude that for the settlor’s words to be binding in law, they must be 






We have argued that the ‘declaration’ is not purely a formality requirement.  Rather, it 
requires proof of a substantive fact, i.e., the settlor’s intention.  As described earlier, a double 
intention is required.  First, the settlor must intend to hold rights for the benefit of another.  
This is a composite intention, which involves an intention to confer the beneficial interest in 
the property on someone else, and to assume the obligations of a trustee.  Second, the settlor 
must intend, by the very words said or acts done, to constitute the trust relationship.  What 
is it about these features of the ‘declaration’ that justifies the recognition and enforcement 
of these trusts? 
 
 It is difficult to identify a clear historical explanation for Lord Eldon’s decision in Pye 
and similar cases.106 Previous concerns about enforcing declarations of trust in favour of 
volunteers had rested partly on the idea that any obligations owed to volunteers could only 
ever be moral and unenforceable in equity, and partly on the view that property should not 
be put beyond the reach of creditors.107  Lord Eldon does not discuss these concerns in his 
judgments, and Macnair argues that the suggestion that equity would never enforce trusts 
which were merely voluntary may have been based on general statements in obiter dicta and 
would have been ‘profoundly inconvenient’.108  Macnair also suggests that Lord Eldon drew a 
sharp and coherent distinction between contract and trusts: while contracts and promises to 
create a trust would not be enforceable without consideration, a trust created by a legally 
effective transfer or a clear ‘declaration’ of trust would be enforceable against a trustee.109  
And it seems clear that contemporary treatise writers, such as Lewin, regarded this conclusion 
as supported by principle and authority.110  
 
Pothier’s Traité des Obligations, which placed significant emphasis on the intention 
and the will, was translated into English in 1806,111 five years before Pye was decided.  It was 
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not cited in the case itself but by the mid-nineteenth century the influence of the will theory 
in English property law was apparent.  Cornish explains that with the decision of Kekewich v 
Manning112 the focus shifted away from voluntary recipients and towards ‘the essential 
prerogatives of property owners’, which ‘necessarily involved the ability to give voluntarily 
and irrevocably’ in a way the law would facilitate.113 We cannot say whether Lord Eldon’s 
decision in Pye was influenced by Pothier, but the will theory may go some way towards 
explaining why we now recognise the proprietary aspects of a self-declared trust.  The 
expression of the settlor’s double intention is a clear manifestation of his or her will to divest 
himself of an interest in his property in that person’s favour, and that is an inherent 
prerogative of ownership, which the law should facilitate. 
 
 We must also try to explain why the ‘declaration’ is sufficient to generate trust 
obligations, and here there are two possibilities.  First, it might be argued that if the settlor 
has externally manifested or recorded his intention to create a trust, and broadly understands 
the effect of what he is doing,114 he ought to know that other people may rely on it, and this 
is reason enough to preclude him from resiling from it.  In other words, the fact that the 
declaration is an expression of intention which may be relied on by other people explains its 
enforceability. A similar explanation has been used to justify promises. The idea is that if A 
communicates to B a firm intention to act in a particular way, knowing that B may rely on it, 
A ought to perform his promise and B can demand that A do so.115 As Raz points out, the 
difficulty with this explanation is that it does not tell us why a promise constitutes an 
obligation,116 when many other statements of intention to act do not.  Given that not all 
expressions of intention to act are obligatory, the peremptory effect of a declaration of trust, 
i.e., the fact that it immediately imposes an enforceable obligation on its maker, cannot be 
fully explained by the fact that it is an expression of an intention to act on which other people 
may rely. 
 
Raz puts forward another explanation of the promise as a species of voluntary 
obligation.  In his view, A can subject herself to a voluntary obligation ‘by behaving in a way 
which normally communicates an intention to undertake by that very act an obligation.’117  
On this analysis, when A communicates ‘an intention to undertake by the very act of 
communication an obligation to perform an action and invest [B] with a right to its 
performance’, A ‘ought to perform that action and [B] has a right that [A] will do so.’118 Raz 
argues further that promises are binding because at a general level they create a relation 
between A and B, which ‘creates a special bond, binding the promisor to be, in the matter of 
the promise, partial to the promisee.  It obliges the promisor to regard the claim of the 
promisee as not just one of the many claims that every person has for his respect and help 
but as having peremptory force.’119  For this reason, the explanation of promises as voluntary 
obligations ‘can only be justified if the creation of such special relationships between people 
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is held to be valuable.’120  He regards promises as ‘an extreme form of voluntary 
undertaking’,121 which tend to arise within the framework of ongoing relationships, and which 
the law regards as valuable.  In his view, therefore, the purpose of contract law is to protect 
the practice of undertaking voluntary obligations. 122    
 
Given the currency of the efficient breach theory, Raz’s theory may not adequately 
explain why we enforce contracts, but this does not detract from its utility in helping us to try 
to explain the personal aspects of self-declared trusts.   We have shown that the key to a valid 
self-declaration of trust is that the settlor intends to undertake by the very words said or acts 
done an obligation to perform the actions of a trustee.  In Raz’s view, this is precisely the type 
of intention which, if communicated, is sufficient to subject an individual to a voluntary 
undertaking, and it is consistent with one explanation of fiduciary obligations, according to 
which they arise as a result of one party’s voluntary assumption of responsibility towards 
another for the latter’s affairs.123   As in the case of promises, a self-declaration of trust creates 
a special bond between the parties.  However, the bond is stronger than it is in the case of a 
promise, as it requires the settlor-trustee not only to be, in the matter of the trust, partial to 
the beneficiary, but also to hold her property for the beneficiary and subjugate her own 
personal interests to those of the beneficiary, where they may conflict.   For this reason, if it 
is to be enforceable, the creation of trust relationships must be something the law regards as 
valuable, and clearly it does.   
 
It is striking that while promises and declarations are both examples of performative 
illocutionary acts, which have peremptory effect, a gratuitous promise is ineffective in law to 
transfer property or create an obligation, whereas a voluntary self-declaration of trust 
achieves both these ends.  It is therefore an extreme and unusual example of an illocutionary 
act, which the law enforces directly as a voluntary undertaking.  Ultimately, its enforceability 
may rest on a combination of factors: the desire to protect and encourage the practice of 
voluntary undertakings, the social benefits conferred by the ability to hold one’s own 
property for the benefit of another, and the fact that, as a result of the influence of the will 
theory, we regard a property owner’s intentions regarding the use and disposal of her 
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